Progressive populism in the presidential electoral race? A conjunctural analysis

The May 2004 elections, with the highest position of the land at stake, promise to be a critical moment in contemporary Philippine history. The political exercise is unique as it follows the extralegal transfer of national power through the forcible ouster of President Joseph Estrada in 2001. In consequence, this is also the first time under the 1987 Philippine Constitution that an incumbent President is competing to hold on to power—thereby presenting an exception to the constitutional ban against presidents seeking term extension. In this light, the elections will challenge elite consensus on how Philippine politics should work as well as how power is shared among the different political forces.

The national elections will test the viability of democratic political institutions in yet another way. With the elections occurring against the social and political fissure that EDSA 2 forces’ moral crusade has created, passions are expected to run high and partisanship will be especially intense. Perhaps at no time in recent history is the political divide between those in power and the opposition deeper and clearer. As such, the polarization between the largely elite and middle-class EDSA 2 forces, and the lower classes, represented by EDSA 3, will be a major factor in the conduct and outcome of the campaign.

Environment

1. The elections have the potential of either helping resolve the looming crisis of legitimacy, or provoking another constitutional challenge. The country today confronts the twin problems of political instability and economic decline. On the one hand, we continue to witness the flagrant manipulation of the judicial system, outright subservience of Congress to executive power, and close collaboration between the administration and media conglomerates in news management—all of which effectively stifle opposition and independent political voices. Equally noteworthy is the apportionment of public office to political patrons, exemplified by the preponderance of traditional politicians in Cabinet positions. This spoils system is a major factor behind government’s poor performance.

On the other hand, the country finds itself in a more difficult financial situation. According to the Freedom from Debt Coalition, as of December 2003, the national government’s accumulated debt stood at about PhP5.16 trillion, PhP1 trillion of which was borrowed during President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s brief two and a half years in office. Yet, the administration’s borrowing binge seems to have done little for the economy: last year, government’s outstanding debt in fact exceeded what the economy produced (approximately PhP4 trillion) while the unemployment rate registered a record 12.7%—the highest of any that existed during the past three administrations.

Government deals with big business regarding service delivery—as illustrated by the collusion of the administration (through the Energy Regulatory Commission) and the Lopez-owned Meralco on the purchased power adjustment (PPA) rates—adversely affect even the middle class while constant charges of graft and corruption belie government efforts to depict itself as a crusading moral force. Despite big corporations’ apparent support for the administration, more and more middle and small entrepreneurs have begun to see it as bad for business.

That Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) came to power through a military-backed people’s uprising or a bloodless coup, as critics of EDSA 2 argue, makes these elections critical in the country’s democratization process. The elections can provide the current administration the popular mandate it badly needs, or they can bring about a relatively peaceful turnover in national leadership that would help restore belief in constitutional processes. Either option, however, will occasion heightened political competition.

2. The various elements of the country’s political, social, and economic decline have combined to produce the following specific conditions:

• Waning belief in the country’s political and legal institutions, evident in intensifying moves to change the form of government, constant coup threats (real and imagined), growing insurgencies, and rise of lawlessness.
• The unraveling of the EDSA 2 coalition, with a large section of the progressive flank ranging itself against the administration and many middle class elements increasingly disgruntled with the government. This disenchantment is perhaps most concretely indicated by the viability of an EDSA 2 alternative to a GMA presidency (i.e., Roco candidacy).
• Macapagal Arroyo’s failure to improve the people’s lives or the country’s economic position has only sharpened the polarization among political and social forces. Mass discontent due to falling household incomes, eroding national economic conditions, government subservience to U.S. interests, and unabated graft and corruption have fueled both legal and extra-constitutional opposition to the status quo. The low turn-out of new voters and the appeal of the "no election" call by sections of the military also suggest that there is growing cynicism over routine politics, and perhaps even of people’s uprisings as a course of action on account of the strategic failure of EDSA 2 to produce real reforms.

The FPJ candidacy

The impact of Fernando Poe Jr.’s entry into the fray has been immediate and dramatic. Upon his declaration of candidacy, Poe’s poll ranking shot to the very top almost overnight. Undoubtedly, his popularity largely depends on his movie and real-life image: the unassailable defender of the downtrodden.

Because of his movie persona and association with Estrada, Poe shares an electoral base with the former president, drawing on the same masa who brought Estrada to power and mobilized during the EDSA 3 mass protests. For die-hard EDSA 2 people, including sections of the military outside GMA’s camp, FPJ may represent what they found threatening in Estrada: an outsider status coupled with vast mass appeal. On the other hand, middle-class sensibilities are offended that FPJ is an actor, without a college degree and any political experience. Some even profess to prefer the lousy track record of the current administration to the uncertainty of Poe’s inexperience. Thus, despite his popularity, FPJ’s star power alone will not win him the election. Factors that may stand in the way include the following:

• The administration’s resources and machinery are formidable, enabling it to forge an electoral alliance with many local politicians and grassroots ward leaders, tap the services of well-positioned media practitioners, and time the release of millions of pesos-worth of benefits to government personnel and voters alike. Indeed, it was partly a reaction to the country’s history of presidents using their office to secure reelection that the framers of the 1987 Constitution sought a one-term limit for presidents. Because Macapagal Arroyo rose to power through extra-parliamentary means (i.e., street protests combined with the defection of key military officers), she is not subjected to the constitutional ban. Nevertheless, the playing field in this election is skewed in favor of the incumbent.

  First, GMA is able to use her office to divert all manner of monies into her campaign chest and to schedule important programs and projects to meet electoral objectives. Second, and perhaps most importantly, with the administration intact, those in the president’s camp will not compete with one another in a race to succeed her. It is noteworthy that in the 1998 elections, with President Fidel Ramos banned from running, the ruling coalition split into two competing camps—thus strengthening Estrada’s presidential bid. Today, with the incumbent president the clear administration party’s candidate of choice, most people on her team will throw their energy into either supporting her, or pursuing senatorial aspirations, leaving the field wide open at an early time for GMA to develop significant forward momentum.

• Political gatekeepers will likely have learned the lessons of Estrada’s successful campaign, when personal charisma trounced a well-oiled machinery. They may, in consequence, have adopted measures to prevent a similar upset victory (including more sophisticated communication and cheating techniques). For instance, vicious personal attacks may be seen as a way to neutralize Poe’s iconic status among the masses. Administration forces can be expected to grow more active and focused as an FPJ presidency becomes more imminent.
• EDSA 3 forces are split, with opposition Senator Panfilo Lacson eating into Poe’s constituency. Although Lacson’s campaign has not picked up, it had the advantage of starting early and thus consolidating a substantial core of supporters among opposition political leaders and the electorate. This may mean either of two things: Poe and Lacson join forces to beat a more organized and entrenched opponent, or Poe’s candidacy gains some adherents among EDSA 2 forces. FPJ has made some moves in this second direction, particularly by picking Senator Loren Legarda, previously with the administration party, as his running mate. Unfortunately, this may somewhat erode his support among EDSA 3 forces, and may be insufficient to sway middle-class EDSA 2 forces. In the end, the populist ideals invoked by an FPJ candidacy may matter more to EDSA 2 forces than the personalities he carries: Legarda may seem a paltry concession in comparison to persistent fears regarding what real political democratization could mean to vested interests.
• Because in part of his late entry into the electoral fray and his general lack of political experience, Poe’s machinery will be less organized than Estrada’s had been. While any opposition machinery can never match that of an incumbent president, some level of organization, down to the district level, is necessary to translate popular support into votes, and to insure that these votes are actually counted.

Given the candidacy of a sitting President and the presence of a powerful challenger like Fernando Poe Jr., the current elections are far more likely to boil down to a polarized race between the incumbent and primary challenger. This impression of a two-candidate race strongly shapes the alignment of electoral forces and the tactics that either side should use. A one-on-one confrontation could benefit either GMA or FPJ, for supporters of other candidates who want their votes to matter must join one or the other dominant campaign. This trend will benefit Poe to the extent that those seeking change see him as the most viable alternative to the current national leadership. Nevertheless, this scenario vastly improves behind a unified opposition and a better-organized campaign.

Challenges of populism and reform

The FPJ campaign has attracted a wide range of political forces, from those who simply want GMA out of office to those carrying a more transformative agenda. Poe’s candidacy presents the most credible challenge and surest way to unseat the incumbent. Many in the progressive movement are giving him the benefit of the doubt as, in the context of Philippine politics, the lack of a track record also makes him less vulnerable to the corrupting influence of traditional politics. Due to the mix of conservative and progressive elements in his electoral coalition, FPJ’s campaign will both depend on and advance his political education—a process largely determined by the balance of political forces around him.

For reformers, the most immediate task is to help change the national leadership. The present administration, whose legitimacy has always stood on shaky constitutional grounds, solidified its hold on power by pandering to oligarchs like the Ayalas and the Lopezes, and closing ranks with the Bush administration even where this requires reversing the sovereign gains of the anti-US bases vote in Congress. More predictably, the regime has shown itself to be deeply mistrustful of popular political participation. For all their exhortations of the value of popular mobilizations building up to the ouster of the Estrada administration, EDSA 2 politicians and GMA apologists have worked hard to prevent similar scenarios—from the panicky and violent dispersal of the "EDSA 3" urban poor march to Malacanang on May 1, 2001 to the intermittent calls for the shift to a parliamentary system. The regime has apparently learned the importance of populism—embracing its shallow expression while afraid of its cataclysmic, leveling potential.

Much is at stake therefore in the opposition’s victory. For many, this means investing in FPJ’s campaign. For reformers, it must also mean ensuring that populism—broadly defined as the negation of elitism and harnessed toward constructive political engagement—remains a focal point in the campaign. FPJ’s biggest advantage is his mass appeal, which traditional politicians will wish to pirate to advance their own image and position, and eventually to dictate the terms of an FPJ presidency. Only if FPJ survives the elections with relatively few political debts to traditional powerbrokers can he eventually rise above the cut and serve the common good without fear or favor. Those seeking to reform the elitist and exclusionary political system must help ensure the link between an FPJ victory and the masses.

If unabashed, relentless politicking has defined the present administration, the pursuit of national interests over and above political interests must define FPJ’s. Nevertheless, the broad strokes of what constitute the national interests—be it providing free vaccinations for children and socialized public education or reforming the bureaucracy and implementing growth-oriented fiscal policies—need to be worked out early on, lest an FPJ presidency be immobilized by political disputes within the ruling coalition. In this light, there is a need to strengthen and consolidate the ranks of social and political reformers that will articulate and defend a reform-oriented platform of governance.

Currently, there is also a tendency for some to rely solely on FPJ’s popularity to carry the day, but we need to understand that reformers need to win both the external battle against electoral rivals, and internal battles against self-interested, non-progressive Poe supporters. Moreover, contentment with Poe’s star power alone both fails to satisfy the middle and upper class electorate’s curiosity about FPJ’s program of governance and insults the intelligence of the working class, often conversant on issues that affect their daily lives. Old-styled politicos would much prefer a vapid, vacuous campaign because it would allow them greater space for maneuver. In contrast, reformers have little to gain from such an approach. Reformers need to conduct an all-sided campaign that may include the following:

1. The conduct of an aggressive media campaign that focuses on and stresses the culpability of the incumbent over the country’s current sad state, and the urgent need for alternative leadership.
2. The development of substantive yet popular forms of political education and voters’ mobilization by combining populism and mass progressive politics.
3. The delivery of votes through a citizens’ movement, which will help broaden FPJ’s electoral base among the middle forces, and build the opposition party machinery. Work on party building down to the district level is particularly critical since the party’s performance can be measured by the number of votes it is able to deliver to an FPJ victory.
4. The institutionalization of mass support for a progressive program of governance between elections.

Toinette Raquiza wrote this paper for the La Liga Policy Institute. She is a doctoral candidate in political science at the City University of New York Graduate Center.

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