Joaquin G Bernas, SJ
for TODAY newspaper
12 January 2005
The petition to allow Fernando Poe Jr.'s widow to continue the protest filed by FPJ himself is not the first time that the presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is being challenged by a 'stranger.' During the first week of the Arroyo presidency, a cluster of cases was filed before the Supreme Court all touching on the legitimacy of her ascent to the position. One asked that the Court declare that 'the occupation of the Office of [the President] of the Philippines by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is constitutional and legal with the full support of the Filipino people and other foreign countries'; another that the Court enjoin Joseph Ejercito Estrada 'from exercising the powers and authority of the President under the Constitution' and 'to yield the presidency to his constitutional successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo'; still another asked the Court to issue a 'definitive ruling on whether or not Joseph Estrada is still the president' and, hence, 'exempt from all criminal suits'; and a fourth one petitioned 'that the proclamation and oath-taking of Madame Arroyo . . . be declared null and void . . .' or that she be 'declared acting President and President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, President-on-leave....'
All petitions were dismissed in a decision notable for its brevity.
The first reason for dismissal was that the Court found the petitions to be for 'declaratory relief' over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Under Batas 129, petitions for declaratory relief are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional courts. Second, the Court ruled that they could not be considered petitions for mandamus or prohibition because they did not allege 'lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of jurisdiction on the part of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions' as required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Third, the Court said that none of the actions could be treated as actions for quo warranto because such petition must be commenced (1) by the solicitor general, (2) by a public prosecutor, and (3) by 'a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.'
Most telling, however, was the Court's declaration that the petitioners had no 'legal standing' to file the suit. The Court said: 'They have not shown any direct and personal injury as a result of President Arroyo's oath-taking.' The Court added: 'Kibitzers, however well-meaning, have no locus standi.'
Under the Court's 2001 reasoning, it would seem to me that the petition to allow Susan Roces to continue the protest of the late FPJ is a petition for declaratory relief outside the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It does not qualify as a petition for mandamus or prohibition and much less as a petition for quo warranto. Finally, does Susan Roces possess legal standing to file the petition?
It is a firmly established doctrine that one who goes to court must have a personal interest in the outcome of the suit. The requirement of a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy is an aspect of the adversarial system which assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues. What is Susan Roces's personal stake in the matter?
It would seem to me that, if anybody has a personal stake, it is Vice President Noli de Castro. If FPJ should be declared elected president, then Noli de Castro succeeds as president. I doubt that Noli de Castro is entertaining such ambition.
I must admit, however, that, in recent years, the Court has accepted a liberal approach to the rule on standing. 'In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.'
I guess that what the lawyers of FPJ are attempting to show is that finding the truth about the last election is of paramount importance to the public. That decision, however, is very much discretionary with the Court. And even if the Court should agree that the issue is of transcendent importance, what should be the nature of the suit -- ”declaratory relief? mandamus? prohibition? quo warranto?
Finally, we should not forget that the issue of FPJ's citizenship was never definitively settled!
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